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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
BURTON BIRKINSHA W and 
VIRGINIA E. BIRKINSHA W, 
Plamtiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT R. BADERTSCHER and 
GERALDINE L. BADERTSCHER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case Xo. 33 
This is an appeal from only that part of the judg-
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ment made and entered on the 5th day of March, 1958, 
in which the Court ordered that ''no attorneys fees are 
awarded to Defendants from Plaintiffs" (Tr. 13). 
In this case Plaintiffs are the assignees of a seller 
under a uniform real estate contract. The fee holder 
one, Ivan 0. Burke (a widower), on the 11th day of 
January 1956 entered into a real estate contract to sell 
his interest to James A. Hatch and Ruth B. Hatch, 
his wife. Hatch and his wife in turn entered into a real 
estate contract with Defendants and appellants herein, 
Robert R. Badertscher and Geraldine L. Badertscher, 
wherein the B.adertschers also by virtue of a uniform 
real estate contract became the buyers and James A. 
Hatch and Ruth B. Hatch, his wife, became the sellers 
of the interest in the land heretofore acquired under 
the contract above mentioned between Burke and the 
Hatches. 
Thereafter, to wit, on the 27th day of December, 
1956, the Hatches assigned their interest in the contracts 
to Dennis H. Anderson and Ruth M. Anderson, his 
wife. Andersons thereafter, on the 15th day of January, 
1957, assigned all of their interest in said contract to 
Burton Birkinshaw and Virginia Birkinshaw, husband 
and wife, who are the Plaintiffs in the lower Court and 
the Respondents herein. 
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In order to more clearly illustrate the devolvement 
of title appellants have set forth the following diagram: 
DIAGRAM SHOWING DE.;VOLVEMENT OF 
EQUITABLE INTERESTS IN AND TO A CERTAIN 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
Civil No. 114403 
Burk 
SELLS 
(Uniform R. E . .Contract) (I infra) 
Hatch, et ux 
Hatch et us ........................................................ Hatch et ux 
SELL ASSIGNS (3) 
(Uniform R. E. Contract) (2) 
Badertscher (Def.) Anderson et ux 
Anderson et ux 
ASSIGN (4) 
Birkinshaw (Plf.) 
Badertscher sues ................................................ Birkinshaw (Plf.) 
The real estate, the subject of this action is situated 
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
described as follows: 
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Commencing at a point 3 rods South of the 
Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 57, Plat "B", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 
10 rods, thence South 4 rods; thence West 10 
rods; thence North 4 rods to the place of begin-
ning. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein, after having 
given notice to Defendants and Appellants herein com-
menced an action for unlawful detainer alleging that 
under and by virtue of the real estate contract and as-
signment Defendants and Appellants had failed to com-
ply with the terms of said agreement and that they 
were therefore entitled to the immediate restitution and 
possession of the premises, togethtr with a cancellation 
of the uniform real estate contract, for treble damages 
for each day holding over as provided by law and for 
costs. 
Defendants denied all of the allegations of the com-
plaint and further, under and by virtue of the following 
provision, contained in said uniform re.al estate contract, 
to wit, "should they default in any of the covenants and 
agreements contained herein, to pay all costs and ex-
penses that may arise from enforcing this agreement, 
either by suit or otherwise, including .a reasonable at-
torney's fee" asked the Court for an award of a reason-
able attorney fee, they having been compelled to engage 
the service of an attorney. 
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The trial came on for hearing January 14, 1958, 
before the Hon. Aldon J. Anderson, one of the Judges 
of the District Court sitting without a jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Court erred in denying Defendants and appel-
lants herein, a reasonable attorney's fee under the pro-
visions of said real estate contract. 
ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiffs and Respondents herein relied solely 
on the real estate contract to support any cause of action 
they may have had which recites as follows: 
''That the buyers and seller agree that should 
they default in any of the covenants and agree-
ments contained herein, to pay all costs and ex-
pense that may arise fr01n enforcing this agree-
ment, either by suit or othenvise, including a 
reasonable attorneys fee.'' 
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein couunenced an 
action which they were unable to sustain, but which none-
theless Defendants and Appellants herein were compelled 
to defend in order to protect their interest in the real 
property. The very purpose of the provision in the 
contract was to help guard .against the situation which 
Respondents have caused by the comn1enre1nent of an 
action upon whieh they were unable to reeoYer and there-
fore unable to sustain. It was not appellant's doing but 
solely respondents' who cre.ated the situation whereby 
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appellants were compelled to engage counsel to protect 
their equity in the property. 
All of the parties relied solely on the uniform real 
estate contract to establish the respective interests of 
each in the land described therein. The contract provides 
for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee, and all 
expenses incident to the enforcement of the contract. The 
attorney's fee therefore immediately becomes a matter 
to be considered along with other expenses in the enforce-
ment of the contract. 
As to the question of attorney's fees and the 
agreement between the parties to p.ay an attorney's fee 
in case of a default in the terms by either of the parties 
the Honorable Court in 1909 in the case of McCorniJck 
vs. Swen, 36 Utah 6, 102 Pac. 626, held that 'a provision 
in a promissory note, by which the maker agrees to 
pay a reasonable sum as attorney's fees, does not render 
the note non-negotiable. This early Utah case was re-
affirmed in Uta,h National Bank of Salt Lake City vs. 
Selson, 38, Utah 169,, 111 Pac. 907. In 15 Utah 308, 49 
Pac. 777, Salisbury vs. Stewart (1897), this Court held: 
''the fact that the makers of a promissory note undertake 
to pay an attorney's fee if suit be brought to enforce 
the collection of the note doer not resder the note non-
negotiable. The Court: ''It appears right that the parties 
whose default caused the expense should pay it; that 
it should not be imposed upon the party who kept his 
contract. The party who keeps a contract should receive 
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from the one who breaks it compensation for his loss. 
If the defendants had kept their contract, the holder 
would have received $3,500 and the interest. They not 
having done so, the stipulation and the law required 
the makers to pay him that a1nount, and no more, for his 
own use, and to pay the costs of the court and attorney's 
fee. Only the costs of the court could have been charged 
against the defendants without the stipulation. The stipu-
lation, in effect, also added the fee of the attorney, if 
one should be employed to bring the suit, to the costs 
imposed by the law upon the defendants. The fee is for 
the attorney. If the employment of an attorney does 
not become necessary, or if one is not employed, the court 
should not .allow suh a fee, and the allowance should not 
exceed the amount charged by the attorney. The allow-
ance is not as a penalty, as interest, or as a bonus. It 
is simply to pay the costs of enforcing the collection 
of the note by suit.'' 
146 ALR 672, 836. 
14 Anl. J ur. 586, #159: "vVhile there is SOllie conflict 
with respect to the right of the grantee in a deed to 
recover from his grantor, in an action for breach of .a 
covenant of title, counsel fees incurred by him in un-
successfully defending the title to the premises, accord-
ing to the gre'at weight of authority the reasonable 
attorney's fees which the plaintiff was required to pay 
or for which he has bec01ne legally obligated to pay in 
his atte·Inpt to defend the title are recoverable. ln other 
words, the reasonable expense necessarily incurred for 
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attorney's fees in defending the title is considered a 
legitimate outcome of the failure of the title 'and a proper 
element of damages to be allowed in an action for breach 
of covenant, at least, where the covenantor is notified 
of the action and does not undertake the defense. This 
view regards counsel fees as the legitimate outcome of 
the failure of title. This rule allowing attorneys' fees 
to be recovered has been applied in actions involvng 
breaches of covenants of warranty and covenants against 
encumbrances. 
In Moto.r Contract Co. vs. Van De Volgen, 162 Wash. 
449; 298 PaCJ. 705, 79 ALR 29, the court held a stipula-
tion in a conditional sales contract for the recovery of 
a reasonable attorney fee to be fixed by the Court, is 
not contrary to public policy. 
See also 41 ALR 2nd 677. 
The plaintiff in the present case was an assignee 
of one of the original parties to said agreement and 
therefore claims some sort of immunity to the terms 
thereof. "It is well settled, however, that the 'assignee 
takes subject to the assignment with all the rights here-
to possessed by the assignor, and a claim good in the 
hands of an assignor is ordinarily equally good and free 
from defenses in the hands of his assignee. An assignee 
of a non-negot~able chose in action ordinarily, however, 
acquires no greater right than was possessed by his 
assignor, but simply stands in the shoes of the latter. 
He normally takes subject to all equities and defenses 
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which could have been set up against the chose in the 
hands of the assignor at the time of the 'assignment.'' 
(4 Am. Jur. 311, 103.) 
4 Am. Jur. 311 Sec. 104. 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT AS PASS-
ING BENEFITS SUBJE·CT TO BURDENS: It 
is not to be infered from the rule that the assignee 
of a contract is not personally responsible to the 
other party for the obligations imposed by the 
contract on the assignor unless he assumes such 
obligations, that he may enforce the contract with-
out the performance of the obligations which it 
imposes. On the contrary, he takes the right with 
all the burdens to which it was subject in the 
hands of the assignor ,and if he undertakes to 
enforce the right by an action, he must show 
that the conditions have been performed either 
by his assignor or by himself. The assignee is 
bound by the terms of the contract to the same 
extent as the assignor. 
It is not to be inferred from the rule that the assignee 
of a contract is not personally responsible to the other 
party for the obligations in1posed by the contract on 
the assignor unless he a~~mnes such obligations, that 
he may enforce he contract without the perfonnanee of 
the obligations which it in1poses. On the contrary, he 
takes the right with all the burdens to which it \\~as 
subject in the hands of the assignor, and if he under-
takes to enforce the right by an action, he must show 
that the conditions have been perfonned either by his 
assignor or by hiu1self. The assignee is bound by the 
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terms o fthe contract to the same extent as the assignor. 
Flo.riJda East Coast R. Co. v. Eno, 99 Fla. 887, 128 
So. 622, 70 ALR 506: "When a contraetor assigns all 
sums due or to become due him from the owner under 
a construction contract, the assignee occupies the same 
position as the assignor with respect to such moneys, 
having the same right, and being subject to the same 
equities, conditions, and defenses, the assignment not 
being a negotiable instrument. 
In the case of Robimson vs. Rispin, 165 P. 979 
33 Cal. App. 536, the Court held that while mere 
assignment of an executory contract does not make the 
assignee liable to the other party, yet, where the con-
tract is fully performed and the benefit inures solely 
to the assignee, and he recognzes the contract as binding, 
he is liable to the other party equally with his assignor. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs and respondents, by their interpreta-
tion of the contract and demands served on Defendants 
and Appellants, plus the .action which they have brought 
to enforce their demands, have forced Defendants to seek 
counsel to defend themselves. The ultimate effect of 
Plaintiffs' action was to foreclose Defendant's equity 
in the premises, even though it is by a possessory action. 
The effect is all the same. For this trouble and expense 
Defendants are entitled to be reimbursed and to an 
award of a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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The matter of sustaining an agreement to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee has been reaffirmed many 
times by this Court. The defendant was put to the ex-
pense of defending his interest in the land by virtue 
of the contract which he had with one of the assignees 
of the oriignal vendor. We therefore submit that the 
action should be reassigned to the trial court for the 
purpose of determining and awarding a reasonable at-
torney's fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAMAR DUNCAN 
DUNCAN and DUNCAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and A ppeU ants 
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